The Space Congress® Proceedings

1996 (33rd) America's Space Program -What's
Ahead?

Apr 25th, 1:00 PM - 4:00 PM

Paper Session III-C - The Low Vision Enhancement System: A
Decade Long Technology Transfer Project
Doug Rickman
Marshall Space Flight Center/NASA

Robert Massof
Director Lions Vision Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings

Scholarly Commons Citation
Rickman, Doug and Massof, Robert, "Paper Session III-C - The Low Vision Enhancement System: A
Decade Long Technology Transfer Project" (1996). The Space Congress® Proceedings. 21.
https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings/proceedings-1996-33rd/april-25-1996/21

This Event is brought to you for free and open access by
the Conferences at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in The Space Congress®
Proceedings by an authorized administrator of Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact
commons@erau.edu.

The Low Vision Enhancement System:
A Decade Long Technology Transfer Project
Doug Rickman1 and Robert Massof

INTRODUCTION
There are approximately 2 million people in the United States who cannot function
normally in society due to vision impairment. Yet, most of these people retain some
sight. Until recently available treatments were essentially unchanged from those
available 50 years ago. Options included various hand magnifiers, colored lenses, and
telescopes mounted to glasses. The one recent innovation was the development of a
stand-mounted, closed-circuit television. Collectively, these aids were often of limited
utility. For example a hand lens is of little value when walking, watching television or
shopping.
As the result of a conscience decision the Wilmer Eye Institute, a part of The Johns
Hopkins University, contacted NASA. They wished to learn if NASA had new
technology that could help low vision patients. As a result in 1985 the two parties
began working together, developing an aid for the vision handicapped.
Their efforts, along with that of many other organizations that subsequently joined, have
created a system of technology that will have impact far beyond the original target
population.

LOGIC
The requirements presented by the low vision patient and the state of medical
knowledge posed an interest problem. The original analysis identified three major
problem areas that had to be addressed. First, the patients are highly variable by
almost any measure. They vary in age, size, medical condition, individually with time,
and functional need. One who is reading has different requirements from someone
who is walking. Second, there was a basic lack of understanding about how the vision
of the patient was affected by the disparate medical conditions. Vision is in the brain
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as well as the eye, and it was well known that what happened in the processing of the
nerve signals had major impact on vision. It was also known that the patients adapted
to their optical problems with a host of strategies, both conscience and un-conscience.
Thus, if a change was made in what the patient saw, would it help? Third, there was
relatively little knowledge about the epidemiology. Who were the patients, how many
with what medical conditions, and what were their functional needs?
The solution that was developed was based on three technologies. Two were
provided by NASA’s work in image processing at National Space Technology
2
Laboratories in Mississippi and head mounted displays at Ames Research Center in
California. The third was commercial developments in frame rate image processors.
Basically the idea was to take video imagery from head mounted cameras,
simultaneously acquire eye tracking information, convert the imagery to digital form,
process the data at frame rates and display the results on head mounted displays.
The use of flexible image processing software would allow the researchers to quickly
test ideas. The epidemiology would be handled along classic lines. It was clearly
recognized that the technology simply did not exist to do all that was envisioned.
Further, the technology was evolving very rapidly. The proposed approach was
recognized as having the advantage that it was highly adaptable.
With further development more explicit requirements were developed. We give a
partial list of some of the considerations. These are presented without attaching much
significance to their order or groupings. Many of the factors had multiple impacts.
• Cost: of any product and the cost of development
As most medical costs in the United States are not borne directly by the patient
creating something that would be covered by existing insurance was a consideration.
• Physiological variation
The system would have optical components. Optical systems are sensitive to angles
and distances. Head size, shape, an interocular distance all vary between patients
and change as children grow.
• Visual requirements change with task.
Reading, conversation, shopping, walking, fixing a meal, and watching television all
have distinct visual requirements.
• Weight:
Both the total and its distribution were major considerations.
• Appearance:
Any aid had to be cosmetically acceptable. There are many medical aids available
which are not used simply because of social factors.
• Ease of use

•
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Any controls had to be usable by someone with controls work for arthritic hands.
Contamination of system by dirt and sweat due to normal use was expected
• Engineering:
The system would have to be shock resistant at least able to withstand a drop from a
table to a floor. Power requirements would be limited by the weight and performance
characteristics of batteries. Can the design be manufactured?

RESULTS
The project has resulted in two discrete products. The commercial system (Figure 1),
termed the Low Vision Enhancement System (LVES) is now commercially available
across the nation. It is flexible in configuration and multi-functioned. It can capture
video imagery from either one or two cameras which are built-in or link to other NTSC
or PAL sources.
The video imagery
is processed, and
displayed in a
head’s up display.
The entire unit is
generally
cosmetically
and
acceptable
light weight.

Figure 1 From brochure “Announcing the Availability of the
Low Vision Enhancement System” by the Lions Vision Center,
Johns Hopkins Wilmer Eye Institute
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The LVES is the
commercial
expression of the
Low
Vision
Research System
(LVRS). This is a
suite of hardware
and
software
devices capable of
capturing imagery
at
frame
rates,
digitally processing
input
this
and
displaying
the
results to various
output devices.
The hardware core
of this system is a
Silicon
Graphics
VGX.
340
Software allows the

researcher to manipulate imagery according to research and test protocols. Example
operations include various band pass filters and image warps. Some of the system’s
capabilities include:
.
.
.
.

accept color video imagery with 512x480 resolution at 30 Hertz,
store or recall from real-time digital disks,
geometrically warp the imagery in a completely arbitrary manner,
adjust processing based on the user’s eye position.

The LVES and LVRS are inherently adaptable. They can be used for research,
simulation, as well as a vision aid. For example the LVRS can help the researcher find
the most effective correction for a patient’s problem, duplicate the problem and give it to
a “normal” user, such as the researcher, and apply the correction for the patient.
Applications of the technology to scientific work other than vision, primarily utilize three
of the system’s capabilities: the ability to integrate disparate data, process the data at
very high rates, and display the result in an “Enhanced Reality”. To illustrate, one
proposed application would integrate visible, thermal and radar imagers to allow an
archaeologist literally “see” into the ground while walking across the surface.

LESSONS LEARNED
In hindsight the development of the low vision systems has taught its participants
several points relevant to technology transfer in general. First, there is often a need for
long term commitment on the part of all parties, not just as organizations but as people.
Ten years was needed to bring the original idea into a commercial reality. A retention
of key personnel and some fiscal stability is essential. Delays were usually the result of
NASA’s problems in one of these areas. We also found a large number of people and
organizations wished to contribute to the overall effort. Our open management structure
readily allowed incorporation of their efforts.
There is a clear desire on the part of NASA to have an effective technology transfer
program. But, there are several issues that often make this difficult. Possibly the
common factor is that much of the technology is simply not at a point where it can be
moved out into the commercial world without significant investments of time.
First, NASA’s funding cycle is yearly. Any agreement covering a multi-year project will
carry a caveat or escape clause concerning availability of funds. When a prospective
partner asks what makes funds available or not the first answer given is Congressional
authorization. Probing farther they learn that personal decisions by many individuals at
multiple levels within the NASA system can all change the level of funding available for
a specific project. The former is not a significant problem for most companies; the latter
is. The lack of a strong, readily enforceable contract inherently makes NASA’s partners
very tentative about committing resources. The net result is an overly cautious product
development.
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Second, accomplishing a transfer is often a major time burden for one or more of
NASA’s civil servant staff. For most personnel there is little, long term benefit or career
enhancement for such work. The people who have the intimate knowledge of a
technology do not work for the Technology Utilization Office. They work for other codes
(organizations), and those codes receive little or no benefit for successful technology
transfer projects. Thus there is a clear disincentive for both the individual civil servant
and the organization to not spend significant time on technology transfer work.
Third, the methods used and the strictures which civil servants must use are often
foreign to others. This affects items as diverse as travel arrangements, procurements,
planning, funding processes, an individual’s responsibilities and authority, publications
and public affairs activities.
With such impediments success requires a personal dedication on the part of the civil
servants and the outside personnel.

CONCLUSIONS
NASA"s Low Vision Project is a clearly successful technology transfer. It has resulted in
an aid for those who have largely become invisible in society due to vision handicaps
and the creation of a basic research tool. The former is practical, effective and
commercially viable. Although NASA’s role in this effort is over, development will
continue for the foreseeable future because of the inherent merit of the technology and
the strength of the organizations created around it. Accomplishing this has required a
decade of work. From the NASA side the largest difficulties were consistently not the
technical issues, rather they were management related. Lack of confidence in budgets,
man power and other resources for periods longer than 6 months resulted in serious
delays. Flexible organization, a freedom and a willingness to change plans as the
situation evolved, and a dedication to reaching the overall goal has been central to
success..
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